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Introduction 
We have gathered here at Poblet, the solemn burial place 
of the royal houses of Aragon and Catalonia, to remem-
ber a birth, not a death, and to celebrate the first of several 
institutional events to commemorate the eight-hundredth 
anniversary of the birth of James I, one of the sovereigns 
who are interred here. 
James I, like his contemporaries Emperor Frederick II 
and Fernando III of Castile, was a major figure of the 
Mediterranean and Iberian Middle Ages. The scope of his 
achievements fully justifies the scientifically rigorous and 
forward-looking analysis of his work and inheritance be-
ing undertaken in 2008 by the peoples who were once part 
of the Catalan-Aragonese crown. For indeed, though 
some of his enterprises reveal insufficient foresight, a lack 
of vision of the future, much of what we are today in the 
demographic, economic, social, political and cultural 
spheres — and much of what we are not — was initially 
forged during his reign.
Great personages, however, do not arise from nowhere 
or operate in a void: they are always the fruit of earlier 
ages and act within a particular context. Their powerful 
actions, moreover, produce an impact on their own era, 
causing it to evolve in accordance with their projects and 
building up a legacy. So what were the essential traits of 
the historical context of James I? When he occupied the 
throne, the final phase in the long period of demographic 
and economic growth fuelled by the feudal system all over 
the Western World was drawing to a close; a strong up-
surge in trade was getting underway, closely associated 
with structural surpluses of farm produce caused by the 
reclaiming of barren land for two hundred years, increas-
es in the amount of money in circulation and the availa-
bility of credit, and advances in technology and thought. 
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During the first two-thirds of the 13th century, the devel-
opment of long-distance trading gave shape to western 
Europe along the Mediterranean and Atlantic seaboards 
and boosted the role of the bourgeoisie in economic, po-
litical and cultural life. It was a period of transition, dur-
ing which the new Roman law vied with ancient feudal 
norms and the concentration of power in the hands of 
monarchs who no longer considered themselves merely 
the leading members of the nobility laid the foundations 
of the new territorial states. It was an age when sovereigns 
strove to make inroads into seigneuries that enjoyed im-
munity so as to recover jurisdictional and fiscal control 
over all the lands in their respective kingdoms; an age of 
rebellious nobles and administrative and tax reform, of 
the advance of ius commune over consuetudinary law. 
And it was then that curricula were renewed in the nas-
cent universities, starting with law and medicine. While 
all these changes were taking place, the crusaders’ last en-
claves in Holy Land were slowly waning under pressure 
from the Mamluks, the Mongols were advancing on east-
ern Europe, and Christianity was fast gaining ground at 
the expense of Islam in the western Mediterranean. 
The Difficult Times of the King’s Minority 
and the First Phase of His Reign
James I was born in Montpellier during the night of 1-2 
February 1208, as the feast of Candlemas was dawning. 
He was the son of Peter ‘the Catholic’ and Mary of 
Montpellier, an ill-assorted couple who in effect had part-
ed before he was conceived. The chronicles, notably the 
one written by the monarch himself, make no attempt to 
conceal these circumstances but they do surround his 
conception and birth with marvels and good omens that I 
refrain from mentioning here because they are already 
well known. He spent the first three years of his life, from 
1208 to 1211, with his mother in the city of his birth. 
Thus the future king’s mother tongue was Occitanian. 
Languedoc in those days was a cultural giant and a politi-
cal dwarf: the poetry of the troubadours and courtly love 
were cultivated there, but it lacked the coherent political 
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structures and the native dynasty that could have formed 
the backbone of a strong state. This power vacuum made 
is easier for the two powerful neighbouring states, the Cat-
alan-Aragonese crown and France, to encroach upon it by 
means of feudal ties. At the time of James I’s birth, the cru-
sade launched a few weeks earlier by Innocent III to eradi-
cate the Cathar heresy, with military support from the 
French monarchy and ideological support from the Do-
minican and Cistercian orders, had unleashed considera-
ble tension. Simon de Montfort, a leading member of the 
nobility of northern France, soon distinguished himself 
among those who fought to defend religious orthodoxy. 
Unable to withstand the crusaders’ onslaught, the local 
nobility, headed by Raymond VI of Toulouse, asked Peter 
‘the Catholic’, who was their superior lord, to intervene. 
The sovereign used delaying tactics to gain time: he nego-
tiated an agreement with Simon de Montfort which in-
cluded the marriage of the latter’s daughter Amicia to his 
own heir, and Prince James was handed over as a hostage 
to his future father-in-law to be brought up in Carcassone. 
South of the Pyrenees the situation was also changing fast: 
the decline of the Almohad caliphate had reduced the 
Muslims’ defensive capacity in the Iberian Peninsula. Two 
great battles waged against this complex backcloth changed 
the course of history on both sides of the mountains and 
were to affect the future orientation of the reign of James I. 
On 16 July 1212 a coalition of Christian Iberian forces with 
Gallic reinforcements defeated the Almohads at the battle 
of Las Navas de Tolosa, in which the count-king played an 
important role. Then one year later, on 12 September 1213, 
a Catalan, Aragonese and Occitanian force was defeated 
by Simon de Montfort’s army of crusaders at Muret, near 
Toulouse. Peter ‘the Catholic’ was killed in that battle.
Battles alone do not determine the history of peoples 
but —as Antoni Furió has recently pointed out — they 
pace it and speed it up. The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa 
facilitated the southward and eastward thrust of the Cata-
lan-Aragonese crown into the lands beyond the Ebro and 
the islands of the western Mediterranean. Muret, on the 
other hand, closed the door to another possibility: that of 
a great state straddling the Pyrenees and based almost ex-
clusively on pacts of feudal allegiance. 
Shortly after Muret, Mary of Montpellier died in Rome. 
James I had now lost both his parents and was confined to 
Carcassone, where he had begun to receive the knightly, 
ultra-orthodox education of a crusader, in Occitanian and 
French. 
In January 1214 Innocent III, the superior lord of the 
Catalan-Aragonese crown, ordered Simon de Montfort to 
present the six-year-old James I to his Catalan and 
Aragonese subjects. The new sovereign was placed in the 
charge of Guillem de Mont-rodó, a master of the Order of 
the Temple, and taken to the securely defended castle of 
Monzón, right on the border between Catalonia and 
Aragon, where he was to complete his education in the 
company of his cousin Ramon Berenguer V of Provence, 
who was also an orphan. 
The programme of training to which James I was sub-
jected by the Knights Templar is one of the darkest features 
of his life. In those days princes were educated by training 
them in the use of arms and techniques of combat rather 
than in the liberal arts. The child was brought up to be a 
warrior king,. Though certain 20th century historians have 
questioned his ability to write, a careful reading of the Lli-
bre dels feits — the chronicle of his reign dictated by the 
king himself — reveals that at Monzón he learnt both Cata-
lan and Aragonese, the languages in which he was to ad-
dress his future subjects. His education also included Latin 
— though he never acquired a mastery of it −, ancient his-
tory, from the Bible to the Roman classics, and medieval 
history, or at any rate the chronicles and annals of Catalo-
nia, Aragon, France and The Holy Land, the last two being 
territories frequented by the Knights Templar. Literary his-
torians have identified numerous references in the Llibre 
dels feits to Greek and Latin history, classical mythology, 
the Arthurian tradition and the Bible. 
While the sovereign was growing up in Monzón, his 
kingdoms were administered by a regency council headed 
by his uncle Sanç of Rosselló, who took advantage of his 
favourable position to provide discreet support to the 
count of Toulouse and the rest of the Occitanian nobility 
to help them withstand the pressure of the French crusad-
ers and the papal legates. Along the southern frontiers, 
towards al-Andalus, on the other hand, the situation re-
mained stable. The attitude of the king’s uncle led Hono-
rius III to advance the monarch’s coming of age. In 1218 
he set up a royal council comprising Archbishop Aspàreg 
of Tarragona and two members each of the high Catalan 
and the high Aragonese nobility. 
Thus James I began to reign at the age of ten. As long as 
he was a minor the Catalan and Aragonese nobles tried to 
make up for the dearth of plunder due to the immobile 
southern frontier and the disintegration of feudal ties with 
Occitania by stepping up the pillaging of the royal pa- 
trimony, much of which had already been pledged under 
the careless administration of the young king’s father. As 
the sovereign recalled some decades later in his chronicle, 
“The land was destroyed and pledged to such an extent that 
we had nothing to eat!” (“No teníem de què menjar, tan 
destruïda i empenyorada estava la terra!”). The first eight 
years of his reign were difficult. The sovereign’s finances 
were at an extremely low ebb and he was obliged to make 
daring coinage mutations. He also found himself caught up 
in the struggles between the leading noble dynasties, which 
caused unrest in Catalonia and Aragon. The nobles, who 
demanded land, money and compensation for the losses 
they had suffered, kept the king prisoner till he gave in to 
their claims. However, with assistance from some of the 
Knights Templar and lawyers specialized in the new ius 
commune, he gradually managed to halt the flow of funds 
from the treasury, stabilize the coinage, forge closer rela-
tions with the bourgeoisie, and impose his authority on the 
aristocracy. Once he had succeeded in recovering the initia-
tive from the nobility, his period of training was an at end. 
001-156 ANGLES.indd   10 14/04/09   09:40:36
James I and his Era. Brief Analysis of a Major Political and Cultural Inheritance Cat. Hist. Rev. 1, 2008   11
The Age of the Great Conquests
The second phase of the reign of James I began in 1227 
and was to be marked by expansion and rapidly advanc-
ing frontiers. During this time he strove to channel the 
nobility’s belligerence and demands for new revenues, 
and the bourgeoisie’s thirst for new markets, in an out-
ward direction.
The recent dismantling of the web of bonds of allegiance 
which Alfons ‘the Troubadour’ and Peter ‘the Catholic’ 
had woven to the north of the Corberes, and the agreement 
between the Holy See and the French monarch made it in-
advisable to orientate military energies towards the north. 
The slow collapse of the Almohad caliphate, on the other 
hand, opened up much more favourable prospects to the 
south and east of the Catalan-Aragonese kingdom. 
So territorial expansion could be directed towards two 
fronts: the kingdom of Valencia and the Balearic Islands. 
Whereas for the Aragonese aristocracy the southward ad-
vance took precedence, the Catalan nobility and bourgeoi-
sie considered it more profitable to expand to the east. 
Both the sovereign and his advisers were aware that con-
quering territory from the inhabitants of Al-Andalus was 
the great undertaking of his reign. James I’s entire chroni-
cle, his entire life, one might say, demonstrates this. The 
Llibre dels feits is devoted primarily to military exploits. 
War, in 13th century feudal societies, dominated all else; it 
was a way of life, a veritable profession, not only for mon-
archs and the high nobility, but for knights and foot-sol-
diers, frontiersmen and adventurers of all types, who exe-
cuted quick, devastating raids into enemy territory in 
search of booty and especially captives. They then demand-
ed large ransoms for the latter, or sold them as slaves. 
The conquest of Majorca was a difficult enterprise call-
ing for a fleet that was sufficiently well organized to be 
able to transport a powerful feudal army, complete with 
its horses and war machines, and to guarantee supplies 
during the campaign. Until the reign of James I, large na-
val contingents from the Italian cities of Genoa and Pisa 
had always taken part in the Catalans’ overseas conquests. 
However, in the last quarter of the 12th century and the 
first quarter of the 13th, the growth of Catalan trade had 
given shipbuilding in Barcelona, Cotlliure and Tortosa a 
boost. By 1227 the Catalan-Aragonese crown already had 
sufficient naval potential and experience to invade the 
Balearics with its own fleet. A few clashes between Cata-
lan and Balearic ships in 1226 furnished the excuse for 
setting the project in motion. The objective, however, was 
no longer to destroy the pirate fleets’ bases but to van-
quish and colonize a maritime enclave of great economic 
and strategic value.
According to the chronicle, preparations for the ven-
ture commenced at a banquet in Tarragona towards the 
end of 1228. The host, Pere Martell, was a galley captain 
from Barcelona who had been to the Balearics several 
times and gave an enthusiastic report of the riches to be 
found there. However, contemporary documents show 
that the decision to launch the attack had been taken ear-
lier on and the preparations, by this time, were already 
underway. Proof of this is the fact that the terms of the 
conquest were defined at a meeting of the Catalan parlia-
ment held in Barcelona around Christmas. The king un-
dertook in writing to share out the lands, castles, towns, 
houses and moveable goods obtained in proportion to the 
military or monetary contribution of each participant. To 
pay for fitting out the fleet, the procurators of the three 
estates granted the sovereign a special subsidy that was 
raised by means of a new tax charged on each pair of oxen 
and known as bovatge. 
The fleet set sail on 5 September 1229 from Salou, Cam-
brils and Tarragona. The conquest, which proved consid-
erably more complicated than expected, was carried out 
in three stages. During the first stage, from September 
1229 to October 1230, the capital of the island and the re-
gion of El Pla were conquered. Ciutat de Mallorca1 was 
taken by storm on 31 December and the pillaging lasted a 
week. 
Only a few of the inhabitants managed to flee the city 
and take refuge in the mountainous zones of the island. 
The majority, basically unarmed civilians, were merci-
lessly massacred by the feudal Christian army. The royal 
chronicle describes the wave of violence in considerable 
detail: 
“They saw so many Moors dead in the houses, streets, 
gardens and farmyards that it was horrifying to see.” 
(“Van veure tants sarraïns morts per cases, per carrers, 
per horts i per corrals, que feia gran feredat de veure.”)
The death toll was so high that systematic destruction 
of the corpses was organized to avoid an epidemic, as the 
chronicle also relates: “The archbishop and bishops grant-
ed a thousand days’ indulgence to anyone who removed a 
dead Moor from the city. And so the people willingly re-
moved all the bodies from the city in order to earn the in-
dulgence, dragging them away with horses, mules and 
nags. And then they collected large amounts of firewood 
and burnt them. And the Moors who died numbered fifty 
thousands, and thirty thousand were captured alive and 
taken prisoner.” (“L’arquebisbe i els bisbes donaren mil 
dies de perdó a tothom que traguera un sarraí mort fora 
de la ciutat. I així, la gent, de bon grat i per guanyar el 
perdó, amb cavalls, amb muls i amb rossins, arrossegant-
los, tragueren tots els morts fora la ciutat. I després re-
uniren molta llenya i els cremaren. I foren cinquanta mil 
els sarraïns que hi moriren, i trenta mil els qui foren presos 
vius i foren captius.”)
The value of the testimony contained in this passage 
from the Llibre dels feits is qualitative rather than quanti-
tative: it demonstrates the scale of the slaughter, the mat-
ter-of-fact view taken of it, and the desire to exterminate 
which underlay the actions of feudal armies at the period 
and applied, not only to those who offered resistance, but 
to those who surrendered or fled as well. 
The second stage of the conquest, which took place in 
May and June 1231, aimed to flush the Muslims out of the 
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island’s mountainous enclaves. The last pockets of resist-
ance, located in a very poor area in the heart of the Serra 
de Tramuntana, were overcome between May and June 
1232 during the sovereign’s third stay in Majorca. 
The conquest of Majorca yielded an enormous amount 
of plunder in the form of human beings, lands and other 
immovables. The Moors who that survived the fighting 
and the massacres were reduced to captivity: those who 
could pay a ransom were released and allowed to live on 
the island as free men, though nearly all preferred to emi-
grate to Minorca, Valencia, Granada or Barbary. Those 
unable to pay were shared out between the sovereign and 
the other participants in the campaign, who used them as 
labourers on farms and in craftsmen’s workshops, or sold 
them as slaves on international markets. Thus the defeat-
ed were not confined to areas of low strategic value and 
organized into segregated ethnic communities, such as 
those that already existed in lower Aragon and were soon 
to be created in Valencia. As Antoni Mas has recently re-
marked, “if there is one thing that characterizes the con-
quest of Majorca with respect to other earlier or contem-
porary Catalan-Aragonese conquests, it is its destructive 
nature”. What could have led the victors to treat the Mus-
lim population of Majorca in this way? The wish to avert 
the danger of a ‘fifth column’ in an island enclave of great 
strategic value that was particularly hard to defend? The 
belief that the island, owing to its small size, could be col-
onized by Christian settlers in a few years? As time went 
by the captives, under pressure from the church hierarchy 
and attracted by the possibility of redemption, gradually 
converted to Christianity, adopted Catalan family names, 
and ultimately dissolved into Balearic feudal society. 
The commissaries in charge of dividing up the real es-
tate carefully assessed the participants’ contributions to 
the campaign and assigned them to one of five groups 
headed respectively by James I, Nunyo Sanç (count of 
Rosselló), Berenguer de Palou (bishop of Barcelona), 
Gastó de Montcada (viscount of Bearn) and Hug IV 
(count of Empúries). The last four were members of the 
privileged Catalan estates. Each of these in turn was to 
share the property he had received with the other mem-
bers of his group and his own vassals. The sovereign re-
ceived half the buildings in the city and half the farms on 
the island; the four representatives of the feudal nobility 
received the other half of the capital city and the remain-
der of the island. 
To assure the defence of the island the grantee in charge 
of each group agreed to set up a permanent host and bear 
the cost of maintaining it. Each of the five portions arising 
out of the shareout out was assessed in terms of cavalle-
ries. These units, contrary to what has been believed until 
recently, were not compact fiefs but batches of real assets 
that were likely to generate a particular amount of reve-
nue. An area of approximately 227 hectares on the aver-
age, spread over several rural districts, amounted to one 
cavalleria. For every 130 cavalleries the holder was under 
the permanent obligation to maintain one armed horse. 
As a result of these calculations, the sovereign had to con-
tribute 43.6 horses while the other secular and ecclesiasti-
cal lords together had to contribute 59.7. 
The chief beneficiaries of the shareout did not settle in 
Majorca: instead — as is shown in the Llibres del reparti-
ment (Books of distribution) — they chose to colonize 
their respective lots by letting them on emphyteutic leases 
or selling them. These settlers were also entitled to set up 
other farming families on the lands they had received. 
Each time the property was transferred, the assignee had 
to pay the assignor a down payment and an annual rent. 
Thus whereas cases of peasants being tied to the land or 
subjected to abusive practices were already documented 
by this time in Old Catalonia,2 the same did not occur in 
Majorca. This has led some Balearic historians to maintain 
that the resulting rural society was not feudal, but a new, 
more evolved frontier society, made up of free individuals. 
I do not share this view, though for lack of time I refrain 
from setting out my reasons here. In the second third of 
the 13th century, the light seigneurial dues attracted a 
gradual flow of rural manpower to Majorca. Applicants 
for land came mostly from Old Catalonia, Languedoc, Li-
guria and Provence, though a few Aragonese, Navarrese 
and even Portuguese are also recorded. 
Let us turn now to the other islands. Minorca submit-
ted without resistance to Catalan-Aragonese sovereignty 
during James I’s second stay in Majorca. Under the terms 
of the Treaty of Capdepera, signed on 17 June 1232, the 
inhabitants of the ‘minor Balearic island’ declared them-
selves the subjects of the count-king and undertook to pay 
a specific tax in the form of cattle and grain. In exchange 
the sovereign agreed to respect their religion and political 
structures. He granted the fief of Eivissa and Formentera 
to Guillem de Montgrí, the archbishop-elect of Tarrago-
na, Nunyo Sanç of Rosselló, and Prince Peter of Portugal, 
who conquered the islands entirely at their own expense 
in the summer of 1235. 
The archipelago became just another kingdom in the 
Catalan-Aragonese crown. Its legal regime was estab-
lished in a Charter of Liberties inspired by those granted 
to Tortosa and Lleida. Under it the Usages of Barcelona 
were relegated to the status of supplementary law, to re-
solve cases not covered by the Charter. When analysed in 
detail, this first great legislative text of the age of James I 
can be seen to constitute a variant of a charter of settle-
ment, designed to set a large city into motion again after a 
period of intense upheaval. A deliberate ambiguity un-
derlies it, since in many of the articles the drafters failed to 
define the territory of application and the reader is left 
wondering if they refer exclusively to the city and its bor-
ough or to the whole of the island. This lack of precision, 
as Vicent Garcia Edo has recently pointed out, was to be-
come one of the defining traits of the subsequent Major-
can legal system. 
While James I, with support from the Catalan nobility, 
clergy and bourgeoisie, was carrying out the conquest of 
Majorca, the Aragonese nobles — who were not very in-
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terested as yet in overseas undertakings — were launch-
ing local attacks against the northern districts of the emir-
ate of Valencia from an area that stretched from the lower 
Ebro to the ranges of Teruel. In view of the success 
achieved by Blasco de Alagón in Ares and Morella in 1232, 
once James I had expelled the Moors from Majorca he felt 
he should assume the leading role that pertained to him in 
the conquest and colonization of the eastern Iberian pe-
ninsula. 
The operation was planned at a meeting held in Alcañiz 
at the beginning of 1233 between the sovereign, Blasco de 
Alagón and Hug de Forcalquer, a master of the Order of 
Hospitallers. Because of the size of the Valencian emirate 
and its population density, the conquest had to be carried 
out in stages. During the first stage, from 1233 to 1235, 
Borriana, Peníscola, Castelló and Borriol, the main locali-
ties in the emirate’s northern regions, were taken. The 
mountainous area of the Eslida range was left till later. 
The military and economic costs of this first phase were 
borne by the sovereign, the Order of Hospitallers, and a 
few members of the Aragonese nobility, such as Blasco de 
Alagón and Eximén de Urrea. Before tackling the second 
phase, the sovereign convened a joint meeting of the par-
liaments of Aragon and Catalonia at Monzón in 1236. 
The clergy, the nobles and the cities on either side of the 
River Cinca were well represented at the assembly, and 
agreement was reached about military and economic sup-
port for the campaign and the future distribution of land 
and booty. The active participation of all three estates 
from Catalonia shows that the sovereign felt the conquest 
and colonization of Valencia should no longer be an ex-
clusively Aragonese enterprise. Outside support, mean-
while, was to be the Pope’s responsibility. In February 
1237 Gregory IX granted the expedition crusade status. 
The Holy See had entrusted the French monarchy with 
the task of eradicating heresy in Languedoc, and the Cata-
lan-Aragonese monarchy was given the mission of 
spreading Christianity along the Mediterranean coast of 
the Iberian Peninsula. 
The army assembled in the spring of 1237 in Teruel. 
The objectives of this second phase were the capital and 
the lands between valleys of the Palància and the Xúquer. 
The city of Valencia surrendered on 28 December 1238 
and the emir, after being granted a seven-year truce by 
James I, abandoned the city and settled in Xàtiva. Finally, 
between 1241 and 1245, the lands between the Xúquer 
and Verd rivers were taken. The southern frontier of the 
kingdom of Valencia, which was renegotiated with Cas-
tile in the Treaty of Almirra in 1244, stretched from Biar, 
in the Iberic System, to Bosot, on the shores of the Medi-
terranean. 
During the early phases of the conquest, the sovereign 
made personal donations of land by granting charters. 
From 1239, following the fall of the capital, James I sought 
to attract settlers by increasing the number of donations, 
which were registered in the Llibre del repartiment. As in 
Majorca, many of the original grantees sold the land or 
buildings they had received and returned to their places 
of origin. At the same time the Moors who had surren-
dered to the conquerors and signed agreements with them 
won the right to remain in the new kingdom of Valencia. 
Thus many of the native inhabitants stayed on under the 
terms of the surrender negotiated with James I and were 
concentrated in Moorish quarters all over the Valencian 
Country. Contrary to what had occurred in Majorca, 
these Moorish inhabitants (Mudejars) obtained adminis-
trative, judicial, religious and linguistic autonomy in ex-
change for paying high taxes. Hence the imbalance be-
tween the extension of the lands conquered and the 
demographic potential of the conquerors led to the devel-
opment of a twofold society in the country regions of Va-
lencia: on the one hand families of Christian emphyteuti-
caries and holders of allodial land, who guaranteed the 
irreversibility of the conquest, and on the other, segregat-
ed communities of Muslims, who produced a substantial 
portion of the fiscal and seigneurial revenues. The only 
reliable data available on the origins of the settlers con-
cern the city of Valencia, where 48.5% were Catalans, 
44.5% Aragonese, and the remaining 7%, foreigners. 
These proportions varied, however, in each area of the 
countryside. 
James I decided not to attach the newly conquered 
lands to Aragon and Catalonia, as the nobles in both 
countries had expected. Instead he created a new king-
dom, which would give the monarchy greater scope for 
action and be less subject to the ambitions of the great 
feudal nobility. Consequently he severely limited the size 
of the territorial concessions to nobles and knights, mak-
ing them much smaller than in Majorca; he promulgated 
a Roman-type legal code known as the Furs, first for the 
city of Valencia and then for the entire kingdom; he cre-
ated a new currency, the Valencian reial, distinct from the 
deniers of Barcelona and Jaca, which were in circulation 
in the Principality of Catalonia and the Ebro valley re-
spectively; and he founded a representative and specifi-
cally Valencian parliament. These distinctive features 
would gradually endow Valencia with the singularity it 
acquired within the Catalan-Aragonese crown. 
In the twenty-six years between 1229 and 1245, James I 
added to the realm he had inherited from his father — the 
84,324 km² of Aragon and Catalonia — the Balearic Is-
lands and the kingdom of Valencia, another 24,791 km². 
The conquered lands amounted to an increase of approx-
imately 30%, something never previously achieved in a 
single reign. 
The Occitanian Dream is Definitively 
Relinquished: the Treaty of Corbeil 
The completion of the conquest of Valencia and the death 
of his cousin Ramon Berenguer V of Provence without 
male issue prompted James I and his advisers, in 1245, to 
renew his old political ties with Occitania, where the 
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French had steadily been building up their power with 
firm support from the Holy See. In 1229, as the conquest 
of Majorca was getting underway, Raymond VII of Tou-
louse had been obliged to give the hand of his heir Joan, 
and the seneschalships of Beaucaire and Carcassone, to 
Alphonse of Poitiers, the brother of Louis IX. James I was 
aware that his hold over his newly-won territory in the 
Iberian Peninsula was too precarious for him to maintain 
an open war to the north of the Corberes range or break 
with the Holy See. He decided to maintain a low profile 
and attempted an unusual diplomatic operation: that of 
joining the lineages of Toulouse and Provence through a 
marriage between Raymond VII and Beatrice, the heir to 
the Count of Provence. The French monarchy and the 
Holy See, however, foiled the operation in 1246 by forcing 
the countess’s marriage to Charles of Anjou, another 
brother of Louis IX. This strengthened the French pres-
ence in the Midi and was highly detrimental to Catalan 
commercial and political interests in the western Medi-
terranean. Moreover, the first Mudéjar rising, led by Al-
Azraq, compelled James I to concentrate on the kingdom 
of Valencia. 
Not until 1258, after the revolt of the Valencian Mudé-
jars had been crushed, were James I and his counsellors in 
a position the resume the defence of Catalan-Aragonese 
interests in Occitania. But by now the situation had wors-
ened. The French, with enduring support from the papa-
cy, had acquired a firmer hold over Languedoc, where 
their intelligent marriage policy now enabled them to 
dominate the two main lineages: the counts of Toulouse 
and the counts of Provence. They had also wiped out the 
Cathar heresy. 
Thus the Catalan-Aragonese crown was obliged to ac-
knowledge that the changes that had taken place in Oc-
citania during the second quarter of the 13th century 
were irrevocable. After instructing his legal advisers to 
make a careful analysis of the situation, in 1258 James I 
accepted the new state of affairs. Under the Treaty of 
Corbeil, Louis IX of France severed the ancient ties of al-
legiance that had linked the counts of Barcelona to the 
kings of France since the days of Charlemagne; James I, 
in exchange, gave up all his remaining jurisdictional and 
feudal rights in Occitanian lands, except the seigneury of 
Montpellier, the enclaves of Carladès and Omeladès, and 
the Val d’Aran. Though this agreement has aroused much 
criticism among certain sectors of Catalan, Valencian and 
Aragonese historiography, in fact it attests to the prudent 
and realistic policy pursued by James I — now an old man 
— towards Occitania. He knew full well that if he were to 
resume a leading role in Languedoc, the result would be 
an open clash with France, the foremost military power 
and best administered State in the West, and with the 
Holy See, which punished any outside attempt to support 
the Occitanian nobility with excommunication. Thus the 
Treaty of Corbeil put an end to expansion beyond the 
Pyrenees and implied a conscious and resolute decision 
in favour of the moves already underway to increase Cat-
alan-Aragonese influence across the Mediterranean and 
in Iberian Peninsula.
Towards a New Foreign Policy
When one door shuts, another usually opens and James I 
put the fall-off in tension that followed the Treaty of Cor-
beil to good use by opening up new political scenarios and 
giving a fresh impetus to the Catalan-Aragonese crown’s 
mercantile and military influence in the Mediterranean. 
The area he chose was Sicily, an island in the midst of the 
ancient mare nostrum with a large grain surplus. The Si-
cilian market was of strategic importance to all merchants 
in the western Mediterranean and the island had been 
ruled since the death of Emperor Conrad IV in 1254 by 
the bastard Manfred, a member of the Hohenstaufen fam-
ily who was acting as regent for the infant heir Conradin. 
Manfred had become the leader of the Italian Ghibelline 
party (which supported the German emperor against the 
pro-papal faction) and had consequently been excommu-
nicated by the Holy See. James I, acting on the advice of 
Catalan businessmen, decided to take advantage of the 
weakness of the Sicilian court. The contacts initiated in 
Barcelona in 1260 culminated in Montpellier on 13 June 
1262 in the marriage of Prince Peter to Constance of Sici-
ly. Unsurprisingly, the alliance was viewed with alarm by 
France, Provence and above all the Pope, who was to en-
feoff the kingdom of Sicily to Charles of Anjou a few years 
later. 
A new revolt of the Valencian and Murcian Mudéjars 
and the disadvantages of a possible excommunication 
prevented the Catalans and Aragonese from helping 
Manfred to ward off an attack from the Count of Pro-
vence. Charles of Anjou, with the support of France, de-
feated Manfred at Benevento in 1266 and Conradin at 
Tagliacozzo two years later. There was every sign that the 
Catalan-Aragonese crown, after relinquishing its ties with 
Occitania, was about to lose its opportunities in Sicily as 
well. But the count-king still had one card up his sleeve: 
on Conradin’s death, his inheritance and the leadership 
of the Ghibellines passed to Princess Constance, the wife 
of the Aragonese heir. However, family quarrels, Mudéjar 
rebellions and old age prevented James I from glimpsing 
the fruits of his last international undertaking. 
The Kingdom of Murcia is Occupied and 
Returned to Castile 
Under the Alcaraz agreement of 1243, the emir of Murcia, 
Muhammad Ibn Hud, had become the vassal of Ferdi-
nand III of Castile and promised to hand over to him half 
the taxes he raised. Thus Murcia had not been conquered 
or even occupied by the force of arms. The king of Cas-
tile’s prime objective was the effective incorporation of 
the Guadalquivir valley and he exercised only a type of 
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protectorate over Murcia: he controlled the main for-
tresses, which he manned with Christian garrisons, but he 
was experiencing great difficulties in sending large con-
tingents of peasants from the Duero, Tajo and Guadiana 
valleys to Murcia because they found the prospects of-
fered by the distribution of land in Jaen, Cordova and Se-
ville more attractive. 
In 1264 a major revolt of Mudejars was sparked off si-
multaneously in Castile and Valencia by discontent over 
the arbitrary way the new local authorities were enforcing 
the conditions of the surrender. The rising was on an un-
precedented scale and had the resolute backing of the sul-
tanate of Granada. Owing to the weakness of the Castilian 
occupation, the rebels in the Vinalopó and Segura valleys 
initially met with success. Alfonso X was unable to con-
tain the revolt along all the fronts, so he concentrated his 
forces in Betic Andalusia and asked the Catalan-Aragonese 
crown to intervene in Murcia. James I, realizing what was 
at stake, called on his subjects to make him a extraordi-
nary grant to finance a campaign to the south of the River 
Verd. The Catalans had misgivings over the undertaking 
but they agreed to apply the bovatge tax once more; the 
Aragonese on the other hand not only refused point blank 
to provide economic or military resources but seized the 
opportunity to demand satisfaction from the king over 
certain unresolved grievances and violations of their 
Fueros. While the army was being prepared, Prince Peter 
carried out two raids against the Murcian Mudejars. The 
royal campaign got underway at the end of November 
1265 and culminated in the surrender of the Murcian 
capital at the beginning of February 1266. James I, consid-
ering that agreements were made to be respected and his 
kingdoms did not have sufficient surplus population to 
permit systematic colonization of any new territories, 
handed the kingdom of Murcia over to his son-in-law, Al-
fonso X of Castile, after partially settling it with Catalans. 
This show of political realism caused discontent among 
those who had taken part in the conquest. The population 
that settled in the Segura valley, however, was to facilitate 
the conquest carried out by James II forty years later. 
Achievements as a Ruler 
James I was not only a warrior but a ruler, who endowed 
the Catalan-Aragonese crown with new administrative, 
fiscal, judicial and political structures. During his reign 
the municipal regime of the main cities was consolidated; 
the former assemblees de pau i treva (assemblies of peace 
and truce) evolved into the parliament, or Corts, follow-
ing the incorporation of representatives of the cities and 
an increase in its attributions; and the old Curia Regis be-
came the Royal Council. In Aragon the Fueros (regional 
laws and privileges) were compiled and the Justicia (royal 
magistracy) was established. In order to boost trade, over-
seas consulates were set up and the universitat de prohoms 
de Ribera — a council of distinguished citizens — in Bar-
celona. This council, and the rules it drew up to regulate 
trade and maritime transport, were the immediate fore-
runners of the Consolat de Mar and the Llibre del Conso-
lat de Mar, respectively. 
Sharing out the Kingdoms
No one, however, is without contradictions and errors, 
and James I was no exception. Though he had surrounded 
himself with forward-looking legal experts and had al-
lowed Roman Law to influence some of his legal initia-
tives, such as the Valencian Furs (code of law) and the 
Majorcan Charter of Liberties, James I had a patrimonial 
conception of his domains: he did not consider himself a 
mere administrator of territories which could not be split 
up, but a lord with the right to dispose freely of his 
realms. 
This contradiction explains why, as his children were 
born, he began to plan how the Catalan-Aragonese crown 
was to be shared out. This anachronistic policy of succes-
sions gave rise to forty years of tension between James I, 
his immediate descendants, and the representative forces 
in each territory. Two of his sons died and another en-
tered the church. That left him with two heirs: Princes Pe-
ter and James. Aware of the opposition the division of the 
kingdoms aroused in the entourage of his first-born son 
and certain social groups, first and foremost the experts 
in ius commune, he decided in 1262 to settle the matter 
once and for all by imposing an agreement between the 
two princes: Peter was to inherit Catalonia, Aragon and 
Valencia, while James received the Balearic Islands, the 
Pyrenean counties of Rosselló and Cerdanya and the sei-
gneury of Montpellier. The distribution was rather une-
ven: nearly 90% of the territory, in a single compact block, 
was to go to the first-born, while the second son had to be 
content with the remaining 10%, made up of several scat-
tered units which were, however, of great strategic value. 
Besides sowing the seeds of future disputes −for neither 
heir was satisfied with his portion of the inheritance−, the 
shareout reduced the military and political capabilities of 
the resulting two kingdoms at an especially inauspicious 
time, when all the adjoining states were acquiring new 
territories and increasing their coercive potential. France 
was rounding off the incorporation of Languedoc, Castile 
was absorbing Betic Andalusia and the kingdom of Mur-
cia, and Provence was being attached to the kingdom of 
Sicily. History was soon to confirm that the solution 
adopted by James I with regard to his succession was his 
greatest mistake. 
Assessment of a Reign 
The overall results of James I’s sixty-six year reign were 
positive. To the 84,324 km² in Aragon, Catalonia and the 
seigneury of Montpellier which he inherited from his fa-
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ther, he added 24,791 km² in the Balearic Islands and the 
kingdom of Valencia, thereby increasing his realms by 30 
%, an unprecedented figure for a single reign. This growth 
was not achieved without cost, however: it caused much 
bloodshed, primarily among the vanquished, many of 
whom, especially in Majorca, lost not only their property 
but their lives. But many of the victors also died in battle 
or while stifling the intermittent revolts of the Valencian 
Mudejars, who were exasperated by the arbitrary action of 
the new local authorities and the pressure of rising taxes. 
James I displayed great political realism in deciding to 
give up the unstable feudal ties on which the expansion 
into Occitania had been based, along with the mirage of a 
multinational state extending from Nice to Oloron, and 
from Orlhac to Teruel, with its hub in the Pyrenees and its 
seat of government in Barcelona. He deliberately set his 
sights on the Iberian Peninsula and the Mediterranean, 
two areas where the Catalan-Aragonese crown, and espe-
cially its merchants, could expand at lower military, eco-
nomic and ideological expense. Thus the outward thrust 
of his reign arose from of a careful analysis of profitability 
and not unsuccessful diplomacy. The decision to respect 
the frontier agreed upon with Castile in Almirra and not 
to annex the kingdom of Murcia are further evidence of 
the realism shown by an old king who had discovered that 
military conquest is worth little if the territory cannot be 
colonized. The inadequate flow of settlers from north of 
the Ebro made it necessary to permit large groups of Is-
lamic inhabitants to subsist all over the kingdom of Va-
lencia. This gave rise to a dual society made up of the fam-
ilies of Christian emphyteuticaries and freeholders on the 
one hand, who ensured that the conquest would be a last-
ing one, and separate Muslim communities on the other, 
who yielded much of the revenue in the form of taxes and 
seigneurial dues. As long as this situation continued, any 
new territorial advance by a powerful neighbouring 
Christian kingdom into an area densely populated by 
Muslims had but slender chances of success.
James I created a composite state stretching from 
Montpellier to Ariza and from Salses to La Vila Joiosa and 
endowed it with a highly decentralized political organiza-
tion by setting up autonomous units, each with its own 
jurisdiction, administrative and representative institu-
tions, currency and measurements. It was complicated to 
manage, but highly efficient, since it did not interfere with 
the economic, human and cultural ties between the differ-
ent territories. It also had drawbacks however: it delayed 
the concentration of power in the hands of the sovereign 
in an age when the monarchies in the states bordering on 
the Catalan-Aragonese crown were increasing their as-
cendancy, with the support of Roman law, at the expense 
of the feudal nobility. 
James I reorganized the Chancellery and encouraged 
the use of registers, in which copies of all the documents 
emanating from the court were kept. With the help of a 
few Knights Templar, churchmen, laymen and burghers, 
he put the management of the royal patrimony in order. 
At public events he addressed his subjects in the lan-
guage of each territory: Catalan, Aragonese or Occitan. 
When it came to writing his chronicle, however, he chose 
Catalan, producing an unusual text with considerable 
ideological contents. In it he voiced a high degree of self-
satisfaction, surrounded his persona with mythical ele-
ments borrowed from the classics, justified his achieve-
ments and silenced his mistakes, and presented himself as 
a maker of peoples and a creator of dynasties. 
Many Valencians and Majorcans still regard James I 
‘the Conqueror’ as the founder of their people, the creator 
of their collective identity and their national feeling. His 
legend had fed the collective imagination of successive 
generations and materialized into numerous popular 
constructions such as traditional tales, songs, the Festes 
de l’Estandard and ‘giants’.3
For all these reasons, and many others which I have not 
time to set out here, it is especially opportune, as I said at 
the beginning, that academic and political institutions 
throughout the lands that made up the former Catalan-
Aragonese crown should be undertaking new research 
into James I and his era. This will enable us, not merely to 
achieve a more thorough understanding of our common 
past, but to position ourselves better with regard to the 
present and the immediate future. These endeavours will 
yield ideas of benefit to us all. The legacy of James I un-
doubtedly has a future, providing that, together, we are 
able to manage it properly.
Notes
[1] Ciutat de Mallorca is the traditional name of the 
city now known officially as Palma de Mallorca. It is 
still in widespread use today.
[2] The term Old Catalonia refers to the territories 
originally reconquered and settled by the Caroling-
ian dynasty, which lie north and east of a line ex-
tending approximately from the Llobregat and 
Cardener rivers to the Montsec massif, north of 
Lleida.
[3] The Festes de l’Estandard (Festivals of the standard) 
are held each year in Palma de Mallorca to com-
memorate the entry of the troops of James I into the 
city. ‘Giants’ are bigger-than-lifesize human figures 
made of wood and papier mâché which are a fea-
ture of popular parades in many localities. Some of 
them represent King James I.
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